

**Eric A
Anderson
Associates**

Eric A. Anderson

An Organizational Review of the Columbia, Missouri, Police Department: Summary and Recommendations

A summary organizational review of the Columbia,
Missouri Police Department and an assessment of the
actions taken as a result of the 2006 study conducted
by the University of Missouri, with recommendations

February, 2012

I. INTRODUCTION

The City of Columbia, Missouri has a population of 109,000 and is home to the University of Missouri. The City has experienced sustained, rapid growth over the last twenty years, growing from 70,125 people to its current size. Recently, it has been besieged by the same economic woes confronting all cities during the recession.

The Columbia Police Department, consisting of 160 officers and approximately 31 civilians, serves the population of the City in an area of approximately 63 square miles. The departmental organization chart is presented in Appendix A. The crime statistics for the City for the last 10 years are presented in Appendix B.

The Department has had four Chiefs during the last 10 years. The department has grown from 136 sworn positions in 1992 to 161 in 2012. Departmental issues have resulted in several studies of its structure and morale, most recently a study by The Center for the Study of Organizational Change, University of Missouri-Columbia in 2006. A copy of that report is attached in Appendix C.

I. PURPOSE

The City wished to conduct an organizational review of the Police Department and an assessment of the actions taken as a result of the 2006 study conducted by the University of Missouri, and to make further recommendations, as necessary. The Project Scope includes:

Phase I:

- 1. A review of Police Department Policies and Procedures, manuals, and organization**
- 2. A review of departmental history**
- 3. Personal interviews with members of the City Council, City Management, Police Department, and others as deemed necessary**

Phase II:

Analysis of data and a report of findings and recommendations to address Police Department problems and issues submitted to the City Manager.

This document submits the analysis of data and the report of findings and recommendations to the City Manager.

II. PROCESS

1. I reviewed the department's General Rules, Policies and Procedures (there are several versions), as well as multiple versions of individual policies and procedures. I reviewed the department demographics, organization chart, turnover rate, Missouri State statutes, City Code, Federal Court Decisions, City of Columbia Crime Statistics, and other relevant data.
2. I reviewed the last approximately three years of Columbia Tribune articles which have addressed the Police Department, paying particular attention to those that covered issues that were considered important by the Department and the Community (see below), and,
3. Over the course of two weeks in December, 2011 and two weeks in January, 2012, I interviewed 130 people, including virtually all sworn officers and civilian members of the Police Department, including the Police Chief; Members of the City Council and the Citizens Police Review Board; Heads of other city departments; and several members of the public who have been involved with police issues.

III. FINDINGS

1. The conditions described in the 2006 report by the Center for the Study of Organizational Change, University of Missouri-Columbia (Appendix C) have not improved. They have gotten worse. Officer morale is regularly identified as having gotten worse. The supervisory culture is approaching toxicity. Internal communication is confused and inadequate. The departmental mission, vision and values remain unclear to the majority of the department. Pay for all above sergeant has been adjusted, leaving many sergeants and officers resentful. The new promotional process is generally viewed with suspicion. Rules and regulations are less clear and confusing. The Police Headquarters continues to be inadequate for its purpose. Training has been reduced to the state minimum.
2. The morale of the department is extraordinarily low. While not every officer is affected, the general attitude of most officers is characterized, by themselves, retirees, and others, as fearful, hesitant and uncertain. They expressed their fear that this set of conditions will lead to situations that will result in injury or death to themselves or a member of the public through over- or under-reaction.
3. The supervisory climate is inconsistent and threatening for officers and supervisors. Management decisions are viewed as being made without adequate preparation for implementation and as inconsistent. The result is further confusion and incapacity to effectively train new personnel.

4. **Communication within the department is very poor: incomplete and inconsistent. Creation of the Lieutenant positions has not improved communications through the ranks. Officers feel they lack vital information about the department's operations that affects their ability to be effective on the street. Many officers complain of hearing of major departmental initiatives through the press.**
5. **The Department has statements of mission, purpose, and department values that could guide the actions of its leaders and employees. However, there are different versions of these that foster confusion and uncertainty. All members of the department could identify the purpose of police work. But, few members of the Police Department with whom I spoke could confidently identify the departmental mission and values. Nor could officers or supervisors confidently and consistently identify the latest version of various important policies.**
6. **Pay compression has been an important issue for some time, but only those above sergeant have been addressed. Many Sergeants and Officers consider this a serious oversight and a major inequity in the compensation system.**
7. **The departmental promotional process has recently been changed, but without reassurance that the promotions will be made on the basis of merit. The process is seen by officers as having been habitually influenced by "old boy networks". However, the current process is viewed as ignoring performance on the job, both good and bad.**
8. **The Department does not have an effective set of general orders, policies and procedures in place as of the submission of this report... Many policies date from the 1980s and 1990s. Since 2009, several attempts have been made to update them. However, the failure to complete these efforts has created a situation in which there appear to be multiple and conflicting policies for many areas of the department's work. Critical policies appear to the officers to change rapidly, with poor communication of the changes.**
9. **The Department lacks a modern, functional facility to support its work. The current facility isolates supervisors and officers from one another and makes all of the management functions, including effective communication and supervision much more difficult.**
10. **Since 2006, the Department has reduced required training to the state minimum of 24 hours per year (October, 2009). Although additional training does take place, this is inadequate for a Police Department that is expected to be of high quality. More importantly, it may leave officers unprepared for the most critical aspects of their jobs, consequently endangering themselves, their co-workers and the public. Finally, it creates a serious liability for the department, the city and the public.**

- 11. Additionally, there is no method of systematic performance management which reaches from the top of the organization to the street. There are isolated measurements efforts, such as the Blue Team. But, ambiguity about the purpose limits its effectiveness and creates unintended consequences: officers believing it to be for purposes of punishment rather than documentation, measurement or training.**
- 12. Finally, the Complaint and Disciplinary procedures are viewed by a majority of the department as being arbitrary and capricious. There is a common belief that officers may not receive due process. Officers describe themselves as often hesitant to make decisions in the field because of unclear policy, poor training, and uncertainty about due process. A significant majority of the officers and supervisors at all levels indicated that they do not trust the leadership of the department to make good, well thought out decisions.**

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations provided here will require a department wide overhaul of the management system.

Police are the only members of society to whom we give the power of detainment and lethal weapons. We also charge them with the right, indeed, the obligation to use them against any of us if the circumstances require it. We do so for them to keep the peace in our communities, prevent crime, and apprehend those who commit crime.

We protect ourselves from potential abuse of their responsibility by passing laws and using court decisions to establish their legal boundaries. We also charge our Police Departments with adoption and enforcement of General Orders, policies, and procedures that assure compliance with laws, court decisions, and community expectations and mores. We also expect Police leadership to train officers well.

The recommendations below are intended to return the Columbia Police Department to its former high reputation while also helping the departmental effectively address community expectations

- I. Review the Police Chief and his Senior Command Staff to determine their leadership and managerial capacity for their offices. Having had the 2006 study at their disposal, and confronting the significant number of public departmental failures, their further failure to improve the conditions in the department makes this review vital. It should be conducted in the context of the Code of Ordinances, City of Columbia, Missouri, Section 21-20(b).**
- II. Communicate clearly and continuously the strategic purpose of the police department to all members of the department, sworn and civilian, and to the public.**


- III. Communicate clearly and continuously the values that underlie that strategic purpose to all members of the department, sworn and civilian, and to the public.**
- IV. Codify the General Orders, rules, policies and procedures of the department. This process has been underway for almost three years. Adoption and distribution of the General Orders, rules, policies and procedures that govern the actions of the members of the department has to be a high priority. Those that are in effect should be clearly identified and well publicized and not changed until their replacements are complete and ready for implementation. When ready, their implementation should be accompanied by extensive training. All those subject to them should receive and personally sign for their copy. Unless extraordinary circumstances require it, changes should be issued semiannually on a regular schedule and be signed for by each officer and a copy of the signed change maintained in the officers' personnel record. Those replaced should be removed entirely from the department's computers and clearly designated as superseded.**
- V. Implement extensive and continual training in all aspects of the work of the Police Department. The average age of the department is rapidly falling, as officers retire or otherwise leave the department. Unless training is seriously improved, newer officers cannot be adequately prepared for their tasks and older officers will begin to lose their skills. Currently, 48% of Patrol Officers on the street have fewer than 5 years' experience.**
- VI. In order to supplement improved training; reinforce the department's internal justice system; provide for speedy interpretation of the ordinances, laws, rules and regulations of the department; and support officers in the field, an Attorney from the Law Department should be assigned to the Police Department on a full time basis.**
- VII. Address the pay compression issue as soon as a budgetary opportunity can be created.**
- VIII. Develop a department-wide Performance Management System with measures, evaluations and regular reporting.**
- IX. Establish and implement a promotional system based upon merit and ensure that all employees understand the system. The system should include testing; interviewing that includes Human Resources personnel, and consideration of past performance.**
- X. Create and implement a fair, impersonal internal justice system for the disposition of complaints and allegations of violations of policy. This system should provide due process to all members of the department and be overseen by the City Manager or his/her appointee.**

- XI. Create a system of joint patrol/citizen committees to develop and assure dialogue between the department and the especially vulnerable, e.g. the minority and low income, parts of the community.**
- XII. Construction of a new Police Headquarters that, through its architecture, encourages communication between and among the ranks. It should not include a jail or holding facilities. The Sheriff has facilities for this purpose and an agreement between the Sheriff and the City should be negotiated so that the Police can use the facilities for holding and interrogation.**
- XIII. The department should pursue accreditation through CALEA. This effort is more than an attempt to establish clear stable policies. It entails a multi-year undertaking that will require that additional resources be made available to the department.**
- XIV. A representative of the City Manager should oversee the implementation of the recommendations of this report. The matters being addressed are both community concerns and departmental leadership and management issues. This makes it very difficult for the department to adequately measure its own progress. The City Manager has ultimate managerial responsibility for the department. His office should supervise the actions taken.**

APPENDIX A



Columbia Police Department



APPENDIX B

City Of Columbia Police Department Authorized Strength and UCR Statistics

Year	Population	Authorized Strength		Violent crime		Criminal Homicide		Forcible rape		Robbery		Aggravated assault		Property crime		Burglary		Larceny-theft		Motor vehicle theft		Arson	
		Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000
1985	64,324			230	3.58	1	0.02	19	0.30	63	0.98	147	2.29	4,295	66.77	968	15.05	3,194	49.65	133	2.07		
1986	64,031			232	3.62	1	0.02	19	0.30	53	0.83	159	2.48	4,078	63.69	734	11.46	3,224	50.35	120	1.87		
1987	63,601			253	3.98	4	0.06	21	0.33	87	1.37	141	2.22	4,287	67.40	785	12.34	3,363	52.88	139	2.19		
1988	64,183			225	3.51	2	0.03	18	0.28	51	0.79	154	2.40	3,988	62.13	740	11.53	3,097	48.25	151	2.35		
1989	64,548			271	4.20	3	0.05	9	0.14	87	1.35	172	2.66	4,206	65.16	661	10.24	3,390	52.52	155	2.40		
1990	69,101			344	4.98	1	0.01	20	0.29	75	1.09	248	3.59	4,125	59.70	741	10.72	3,242	46.92	142	2.05		
1991	69,653	98	1.41	435	6.25	5	0.07	34	0.49	83	1.19	313	4.49	4,227	60.69	786	11.28	3,291	47.25	150	2.15		
1992	70,125	99	1.41	472	6.73	3	0.04	31	0.44	137	1.95	301	4.29	4,421	63.04	667	9.51	3,585	51.12	169	2.41		
1993	73,683	106	1.44	439	5.96	1	0.01	30	0.41	108	1.47	300	4.07	4,269	57.94	571	7.75	3,532	47.94	166	2.25		
1994	74,302	110	1.48	414	5.57	9	0.12	36	0.48	89	1.20	280	3.77	4,081	54.92	589	7.93	3,326	44.76	166	2.23		
1995	74,717	110	1.47	487	6.52	2	0.03	40	0.54	120	1.61	325	4.35	4,262	57.04	522	6.99	3,566	47.73	174	2.33	26	0.35
1996	75,207	113	1.50	403	5.36	3	0.04	33	0.44	96	1.28	271	3.60	4,652	61.86	490	6.52	3,969	52.77	193	2.57	24	0.32
1997	75,810	114	1.50	375	4.95	4	0.05	28	0.37	91	1.20	252	3.32	4,658	61.44	517	6.82	3,941	51.99	200	2.64	19	0.25
1998	78,734	117	1.49	376	4.78	6	0.08	38	0.48	77	0.98	255	3.24	4,027	51.15	494	6.27	3,327	42.26	206	2.62	22	0.28
1999	79,347	121	1.52	333	4.20	2	0.03	13	0.16	99	1.25	219	2.76	3,686	46.45	594	7.49	2,923	36.84	169	2.13	30	0.38
2000	84,531	127	1.50	374	4.42	9	0.11	26	0.31	84	0.99	255	3.02	3,233	38.25	485	5.74	2,611	30.89	137	1.62	28	0.33
2001	85,052	129	1.52	439	5.16	4	0.05	16	0.19	140	1.65	279	3.28	3,458	40.66	455	5.35	2,822	33.18	181	2.13	12	0.14
2002	85,700	136	1.59	410	4.78	2	0.02	31	0.36	90	1.05	287	3.35	3,427	39.99	432	5.04	2,801	32.68	194	2.26	7	0.08
2003	87,470	139	1.59	422	4.82	2	0.02	17	0.19	84	0.96	319	3.65	3,266	37.34	459	5.25	2,632	30.09	175	2.00	10	0.11
2004	89,312	141	1.58	429	4.80	1	0.01	17	0.19	106	1.19	305	3.41	3,017	33.78	428	4.79	2,438	27.30	151	1.69	8	0.09
2005	90,304	144	1.59	477	5.28	7	0.08	19	0.21	114	1.26	337	3.73	3,065	33.94	506	5.60	2,386	26.42	173	1.92	28	0.31
2006	92,485	147	1.59	460	4.97	2	0.02	23	0.25	113	1.22	322	3.48	3,105	33.57	544	5.88	2,335	25.25	226	2.44	12	0.13
2007	95,595	149	1.56	617	6.45	3	0.03	30	0.31	141	1.47	443	4.63	3,323	34.76	594	6.21	2,509	26.25	220	2.30	7	0.07
2008	101,033	152	1.50	392	3.88	5	0.05	19	0.19	138	1.37	230	2.28	3,951	39.11	836	8.27	2,968	29.38	147	1.45	10	0.10
2009	102,588	157	1.53	501	4.88	3	0.03	32	0.31	157	1.53	309	3.01	3,906	38.07	692	6.75	3,082	30.04	132	1.29	11	0.11
2010	108,500	160	1.47	530	4.88	3	0.03	37	0.34	131	1.21	359	3.31	3,816	35.17	552	5.09	3,129	28.84	135	1.24	7	0.06
2011		160	#DIV/0!																				

University of Missouri Police Department 2010 Authorized Strength and UCR Statistics

Year	Population*	Authorized Strength		Violent crime		Criminal Homicide		Forcible rape		Robbery		Aggravated assault		Property crime		Burglary		Larceny-theft		Motor vehicle theft		Arson	
		Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000
2010	6,858	35	5.10	13	1.90	0	0.00	1	0.15	1	0.15	11	1.60	364	53.08	12	1.75	348	50.74	4	0.58	0	0.00

* 6,286 - Student population living on core MU campus; 572 - Student population living in extended campus housing. 32,415 - Overall student population for 2010-11 Academic Year. Approx. 12,000 faculty and staff.

Missouri Cities over 100,000 in Population 2010 UCR Statistics

City	Population**	Violent crime		Criminal Homicide		Forcible rape		Robbery		Aggravated assault		Property crime		Burglary		Larceny-theft		Motor vehicle theft		Arson	
		Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000	Total	per 1000
COLUMBIA	108,500	530	4.88	3	0.03	37	0.34	131	1.21	359	3.31	3,816	35.17	552	5.09	3,129	28.84	135	1.24	7	0.06
INDEPENDENCE	116,830	484	4.14	8	0.07	43	0.37	123	1.05	310	2.65	7,223	61.82	1246	10.67	5,242	44.87	735	6.29	22	0.19
KANSAS CITY	459,787	5,441	11.83	99	0.22	229	0.50	1615	3.51	3498	7.61	26,787	58.26	7084	15.41	16,547	35.99	3156	6.86	342	0.74
SPRINGFIELD	159,498	1,328	8.33	11	0.07	120	0.75	310	1.94	887	5.56	15,216	95.40	2188	13.72	12,024	75.39	1004	6.29	59	0.37
ST. LOUIS	319,294	6,205	19.43	144	0.45	188	0.59	2125	6.66	3748	11.74	27,324	85.58	6705	21.00	16,356	51.23	4263	13.35	250	0.78

** Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File, Table P1.

APPENDIX C

*Organizational Analysis Of
City of Columbia Police Department*

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

November 29, 2006

*Center for the Study of Organizational Change
University of Missouri-Columbia*



SCOPE OF WORK

On August 7th, 2006, Chief Randy Boehm of the City of Columbia Police Department (CPO) contracted with Dr. Michael Diamond of the University of Missouri-Columbia's Center for the Study of Organizational Change (CSOC) and his associate Dr. Christopher Awad to perform an organizational study of CPO. It was agreed that an organizational study of the department would be conducted to assess the culture of CPO and to provide clarification of problems and issues that were only generally identified in a recent City of Columbia survey. This report is intended to best depict the organizational culture (i.e., assumptions, perspectives, values and experiences of employees) and should be taken as a whole and not out of context. Because CSOC analysts maintain their focus of study on the organization, they make no personnel recommendations.

METHOD OF STUDY

Insofar as organizations are open systems, organizational issues and problems cannot be adequately understood with simple causal explanations or singling out for blame any individual or event. Therefore, CSOC analysts review historical and contextual factors that contribute to the current organizational climate. Organizations are also perceptual and experiential systems that are defined as much by their members' experiences and perceptions as they are by facts, figures, documents and dates. Moreover, many organizational problems and conflicts are rooted in human relationships. Thus factual and historical data alone are typically insufficient for adequately understanding organizations and successfully addressing their problems. For this reason, CSOC analysts believe it is important to supplement factual information with narrative data. Such data, gained from confidential, structured interviews, provide a deeper understanding of organizational problems as well as the culture in which they are imbedded.

The organizational analysis that follows is based on the collection of factual, historical, and narrative data. Factual data were gathered from CPO policies and procedures, organization charts, historical documents, and a review of facilities and equipment. Narrative data were collected through approximately sixty-seven scheduled 50-minute interviews with individual members and stakeholders of CPO and five 50-minute group interviews (each of four police shifts and a civilian employee group) involving approximately sixty-four participants. In total, CSOC analysts spoke individually or in groups with approximately two-thirds of the department's employees. Individual interviews were held on the MU campus and group interviews were held at CPO headquarters. Please note that CSOC analysts randomly chose participants from a complete list of employees provided by CPO.

All interviewees were offered confidentiality and anonymity. Analysts indicated that they would further protect participant privacy by assuring that any comments included in the study would be represented only in terms of broad themes and patterns. However, it was conveyed that the analysts cannot assure confidentiality to group interviewees given the public nature of these discussions, and insofar that statements by group participants to non-participants subsequent to the interviews are beyond the

control of the analysts. All interviews were begun with a review of the purpose of the consultation and the scope of work, including its limitations. CSOC analysts synthesized the narrative data from the interviews in terms of themes and patterns, which were subsequently used to inform a systematic organizational analysis.

In addition to factual and narrative data, the CSOC analysts engaged in multiple observational activities. Each analyst visited all four shift meetings of patrol officers and made several tours of the department facilities. One analyst rode along with a patrol officer from 10pm to 2am on a Friday night in October.

It is important to note that without participant confirmation, findings are considered preliminary. Therefore, on October 23rd, Drs. Diamond and Awad met with Chief Boehm to share preliminary impressions. On October 25th, they met with the Command Staff (i.e., Chief and Captains). They then held three 90-minute sessions open to all employees (two on October 26th, and one on October 27th). In all meetings, participants were invited to confirm, reject, or modify the emergent dimensions. The primary themes identified were confirmed with modifications that are reflected in this report.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

CPO is organized into five divisions, each headed by a Captain who reports to the Chief. The Executive Assistant to the Chief is responsible for the Personnel Development Unit and the Training Unit. The Administrative Support Commander is responsible for Fleet Maintenance, Criminal Records, Equipment, Computer Operations, Custodians, and CSA Process Server. The Investigative Commander is in charge of Major Crimes, Narcotics, and the Family Services Unit. The East District Commander is responsible for the patrol officers in the district, Station Masters, Typists, Traffic Unit, and K-9 Unit. The West District Commander is responsible for patrol officers in the district, Community Services Unit, Youth Services Unit, and the Media Specialist. There are 147 sworn personnel and 33 civilian employees in the department. The below table provides a breakdown of CPO employees by gender and race.

	Sworn	Civilian
White Male	107	8
White Female	23	21
Black Male	11	2
Black Female	1	2
Other	5	
Vacant		1
Total	147	34

ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

While historical and factual information help provide a context for an organization's current state of affairs, critical incidents are important to present organizational dilemmas. Critical incidents are past occurrences that are perceived by a significant number of organizational members and stakeholders to have contextual or direct relevance for present organizational challenges and issues. The following critical incidents were identified by a majority of interviewees.

Under the leadership of Norman Botsford, CPO underwent significant structural and operational changes. In an effort to move toward a community policing model, the city was divided into East and West Districts, each further divided into beats. Captains, who previously acted as shift commanders, were pulled from the shifts, creating greater distance between Captains and patrol officers and leaving shift sergeants with additional responsibility. At the same time, officers moved from a work schedule of six days on followed by two days off to a schedule of four days on and two days off. Under the previous schedule, officers worked under the supervision of their specific sergeants every day and had one day each week in which the entire squad was present. With the changed schedule, only one-third of officers work with their primary supervisor (sergeant) each day, while two-thirds work with their supervisor only half of their work week or less. The schedule change, which was welcomed by the officers due to the fatigue of a six-day work week, resulted in a weakened squad structure.


Another critical event was the well-publicized competition between Captain Eric Meyer and then Captain Randy Boehm for the position of Chief. This was a particularly divisive time at CPO. There were Meyer supporters and Boehm supporters and existing tensions within the department were exacerbated. The tragic death of Officer Molly Bowden and the shocking murder conviction of Steven Rios were also stressful events that further challenged the department.

The more recent event that affects CPO is the recent transition in City leadership. Nearly all interviewees described previous leadership as unsupportive of CPO and neglectful of the department. Over the years, CPD's status as one of the best paying police departments in the state and one of the best departments to work for apparently went down. Many stated that the number of officers on the streets has not kept up with annexations and population growth. Most interviewees expressed hope that the new City Manager would be supportive of the department.

Current Culture

As a consequence of multiple historical events (most notably the removal of Captains from the patrol shifts), CPO is a fragmented organization. There is a disconnection between the leadership (i.e. Command Staff) and the rest of the department (i.e., officers, sergeants, detectives, CSAs and civilians). Over time, particularly during times of stress (e.g., critical incidents described above), these groups have grown more strongly opposed to one another. The tension that results from this fragmentation causes ongoing frustration and anger for both groups and has created conflict between and within the groups. The distance between the groups has led to a lack of

trust and functions as a reservoir for limited and distorted communication. This distance allows people on both sides to imagine what people on the opposing side are "up to" and creates a generally defensive atmosphere within CPO. This negative culture promotes disengagement (i.e., the tendency to "check out") at all levels of the organization, and has led to cynicism and the tacit philosophy of "make no waves" for fear of retribution. The following graphic represents this current dynamic.



Implications

In all levels of the organization, there are feelings of powerlessness, frustration and anger, which have led to disrespectful behavior and further resentment. At present, neither side appears to be able to empathize with or trust the other side enough to appreciate their unique perspective and experience. It is as if each group is unable to "see" the other's point of view. This culture also hinders the department's ability to learn from their experiences, and to detect and correct problems as they arise. The fragmentation between the Command Staff and the rest of the organization has led to the paradoxical desire for more active leadership *and* the rejection of leadership. All employees appear to respect the chain of command and express no interest in undermining it. Rather, those "on the street" would like to feel comfortable articulating their needs and to trust their leadership to advocate for resources. Also, they would like to be able to ask for clarification, make suggestions, or to some degree have input

into decisions without being dismissed. Employees want leadership to address conflicts productively and be open about criteria for promotions and specialty assignments. Many believe that current personnel decisions are not merit based and are made on the basis of favoritism or in an effort to promote diversity within CPO. Employees also need strategic direction through the revision and implementation of a strategic plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Steps toward improving CPO morale and effectiveness

- 1) CPO needs to address structural, horizontal and vertical fractures, which have developed over time in the organization. First, coordination among Captains must be restored by developing the capacity to function as a team. In order to do so, the Command Staff ought to participate in process consultation and conflict resolution sessions in which roles, responsibilities, and authority among the Command Staff can be better clarified and reinforced by the Chief. CPO ought to consider appointing a Major or Deputy Chief to provide more clarity of authority over the department and its Command Staff concerning internal operations and the handling of crises and critical incidents. Whether or not CPO appoints a Major, it will need to address issues and roles among the Command Staff in order to improve organizational effectiveness.
- 2) Vertical linkages and coordination between Captains and the level of Sergeants and Patrol Officers need to be addressed. These linkages are currently weak and the Captains have insufficient contact with the Patrol Officers and their everyday policing activities and challenges. More frequent visits with the Officers on their shifts would promote better communication, particularly if Captains actively listen to and take into account Patrol Officers' issues and concerns. CPO ought to consider the addition of Lieutenants who could provide more effective linkages and better two-way communications between Captains and Sergeants and Patrol Officers. Lieutenants would have to be effective managers and communicators, individuals not easily intimidated by Captains, Sergeants, or Patrol Officers. These individuals would assume responsibility for maintaining the flow of information and communication between the Command Staff and policing operations. Whether or not CPO decides to install Lieutenants, Captains need to renew contacts with Sergeants and Patrol Officers on shifts.
- 3) The Chief of CPO needs to provide all employees with a more explicit vision and direction. This could be accomplished with a renewed strategic planning process and commitment to its implementation. The renewed and reinvigorated strategic planning activities and document would then be available as an evaluative instrument with timelines and expected outcomes. The strategic plan and its consistent implementation would provide CPO with clarity of direction in community policing and various adaptive strategies to cope with a changing and growing city of Columbia.

- 4) The Chief and the Command Staff need to be more open to feedback (negative and positive) from all employees. Retribution against employees for making recommendations must be viewed as unacceptable. With an improved structure for accountability and integration of divisions and functions, the culture of CPD led by the Chief and the Command Staff ought to more explicitly encourage employees to identify problems and issues at the time they occur so that they can be addressed by those in positions of authority. By promoting better two-way communications between Command Staff and employees, CPD will become more effective at addressing problems and more capable of dealing with conflicts as they occur. Over time these proactive strategies will minimize the tendency in the CPD culture to avoid internal conflict.
- 5) CPD ought to collaborate with Human Resources to more thoroughly evaluate compensation for Patrol Officers and all employees by referring to salary surveys and compensation packages of comparable cities located alongside large public Universities. In particular, CPD needs to address the issue of salary compression for Officers with 3-4 years of service.
- 6) CPD needs to make clear and explicit the basis on which promotions and hires are made. CPD employees must have an understanding of the meritorious criteria for various appointments and job positions. Similarly, CPD leadership needs to address any inconsistencies or contradictions in the implementation of personnel policies as they relate to hiring, promotions, and discipline.
- 7) CPD needs to assess and prioritize its resource needs for the next one to five years. In addition to personnel needs for additional Patrol Officers and Civilian Staff, CPD needs to reevaluate its use of automation and technology throughout the organization. In particular, CPD needs to reevaluate the adequacy of its main facility and the satellite facilities throughout the city of Columbia. The ongoing assessment of resources and facilities ought to be included in strategic planning activities (noted above).

CONCLUSION

CPD faces significant challenges. Change will require persistence and follow-through from employees, leadership and city management. In particular, four main strengths of CPD will serve as a foundation for addressing the issues identified in this study. First, employees (including civilian employees) are committed to the mission of the organization, expressing pride in law enforcement work. Second, the department is well-educated. With minimum requirements for 60 hours of college credit, many officers in the department have bachelor's degrees, and many employees have master's degrees. Third, employees are innovative and have ideas for addressing a host of issues in the department (e.g., logistics for days off schedules and technology utilization). Fourth, employees are "cautiously optimistic" that CPD culture will improve. This was evident in their full and candid participation in this study.